@eigen @GrapheneOS @illumniscate @neil GrapheneOS is not affected by update issues, and thanks to their collaboration with a major Android OEM since June 2025, GrapheneOS can offer security preview releases. https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/27068-grapheneos-security-preview-releases

@j2 @GrapheneOS @illumniscate @neil @gael Please note that Murena is a scam, this is not an honest project and it's dangerous to use it.

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private

Old blog by a LineageOS dev, the issues with /e/a are not news : https://ewwlo.void.partidopirata.com.ar/

In this discussion on Hacker News, a user who has used Murena products confirms that /e/OS completely breaks Android's security model, signed with Google's test keys with an unlocked bootloader that cannot be locked, which would have been pointless since these test keys are not intended for production. Of course, users duped by Murena's misleading marketing will claim that this is not important and assert that the GrapheneOS project is toxic, but correcting misinformation has never been toxic behavior.

There are many other problems with /e/. Gael Duval is a scammer, and he, his team, and his community are involved in spreading misinformation about GrapheneOS and its users. In fact, the people in this Hacker News thread who are attacking GrapheneOS for things it doesn't do are users of /e/.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47046979

@AwetTesfaiesus /e/OS and GrapheneOS are very different. Fairphone do not care about security, and /e/OS is a malicious operating system that seriously compromises the security of AOSP, deceives users, and includes its own invasive services that are far worse than Google's because its security is catastrophic, notably sending users' voices to OpenAI without their consent. /e/OS steals code from LineageOS and other applications and turns it into a significantly worse fork. /e/OS is operated by Murena, a for-profit company that has received millions in EU subsidies for their fraudulent products. It is a scandal; the people behind this project are not trustworthy and want to exploit your data.

@GrapheneOS is a production-quality operating system that significantly improves the security and privacy of AOSP. It employs much more talented and professional engineers and developers, does not send any data to any service, and is the only operating system that can resist Cellebrite and other similar forensic companies. It allows you to use all official Google services in the standard sandbox without special privileges, whereas on most mobile operating systems, including /e/, Google always has privileged access to the device. MicroG is not a reliable solution and is just another implementation of Google services, as a result, GrapheneOS offers significantly better compatibility with Android applications, allowing you to run them securely and with respect for your privacy.

GrapheneOS is also much more stable, much easier to use, and offers many more features. Don't take my word for it, try it out and see for yourself.

GrapheneOS is collaborating with a major Android OEM to offer an alternative to Pixel devices and is expected to be available in 2027. The device will be secure and meet all the requirements of the project listed here : https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices

Here are a few links to back up my claims :

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-privacysecurity-patches-and-protections-arent-private

https://ewwlo.void.partidopirata.com.ar/

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2024-documentation

https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#microg-signature-spoofing

https://privsec.dev/posts/android/android-tips/

https://privsec.dev/posts/android/choosing-your-android-based-operating-system/