@jhaas @drscriptt Meanwhile, as more #RPKI invalid #BGP routes are dropped, we are working on making the invisible visible again with Rotonda. https://ripe91.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/sessions/15/CLRNRY/

@drscriptt @jhaas I remember launching #RPKI in 2011. It took years of publishing ROAs, learning from mistakes and fixing bad quality ROAs before the operator community got to the point where they felt comfortable dropping invalid routes.

ASPA will be the same, although perhaps a bit quicker because of the huge installed base of (ASPA capable) validators: https://rov-measurements.nlnetlabs.net/stats/

@asl Hmm, indeed. I may have remembered incorrectly... 🧐

Routinator, our RPKI validation software, now sees more than 1000 Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects in the wild. These are published by operators to detect and prevent BGP route leaks.

ASPAs can be created in the hosted RPKI services of the RIPE NCC and ARIN, as well as our open-source RPKI Certification Authority software, Krill.

Open-source routing projects such as BIRD, OpenBGPD and FRRouting already offer support for ASPA, while major commercial vendor support is expected later this year.

#OpenSource #OpenStandards #IETF #RPKI #BGP #RoutingSecurity